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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________________ 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. 
 Plaintiffs are members of a class of disabled students 
who attend schools in certain districts in Pennsylvania and 
who claim that Pennsylvania’s method for distributing special 
education funds violates various laws, including the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act [“IDEA”], 
Americans with Disabilities Act [“ADA”], and the 
Rehabilitation Act [“RA”].  After a bench trial, the District 
Court found that the funding formula did not deprive the class 
of a free appropriate public education [“FAPE”] as required 
by the IDEA and did not discriminate against them in 
violation of either the ADA or RA.   Plaintiffs do not 
challenge the District Court’s finding that the funding 
formula does not violate the IDEA but do challenge its 
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conclusions about their ADA and RA claims.
1
  Although 
compliance with the IDEA through the provision of a FAPE 
does not immunize a program or practice from being 
challenged under the ADA or RA, we agree with the District 
Court that Plaintiffs did not produce evidence showing that 
Pennsylvania’s funding program violates the ADA or RA and 
will thus affirm. 
II. 
 Under the IDEA, states that provide special education 
funds are eligible for federal funds to implement state-wide 
special education programs that guarantee a FAPE to eligible 
disabled children.  20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A).   To this end, 
Pennsylvania enacted 24 P.S. § 25-2509.5, which sets forth its 
special education funding formula.  Under the formula, each 
school district receives, among other things, a base 
supplement, which is calculated by taking the total amount of 
base supplement money available and apportioning it among 
all districts based on the average daily membership of the 
district from the prior year under the assumption that 16% of 
students in each district are disabled.   
 The class relevant to this appeal encompasses “all 
identified special-needs students attending schools with a 
17% or greater enrollment of special needs students and with 
a [market value/personal income ratio] of .65 or greater” 
(hereinafter the “class districts”).2   After trial, the District 
Court found that the majority of children in Pennsylvania 
attend schools in districts where the disabled students 
constitute 15% or less of the district’s student population 
(hereinafter the “nonclass districts”).  Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. 
Bruce Baker, provided evidence that the average special 
education subsidy per special education student in the class 
                                              
1
 Plaintiffs asserted other claims for which judgment 
was entered in favor of Defendants either on summary 
judgment or after trial but they do not appeal these rulings.   
 
2
 The District Court certified a second class that was 
comprised of disabled students with limited English 
proficiency [“LEP”] who attend school districts that have a 
10% or greater population of LEP students.  Claims on behalf 
on this class are not being pursued in this appeal.  
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totaled $3327 and the average special education subsidy per 
special education student who attended schools in nonclass 
districts totaled $4108.  Thus, students in the class, namely 
those who attend schools in districts where the disabled 
student population exceeds 17%, receive less funding per 
student than nonclass students. 
 Aside from evidence showing differences in funding 
per student, Dr. Baker provided evidence that: (1) students in 
class districts who received individualized educational plans
3
 
[“IEP”] under the IDEA scored lower on Pennsylvania’s 
standardized reading and math tests than IEP students in 
nonclass districts;
4
 and (2) the graduation rates for IEP 
students in class districts was lower than the rate for IEP 
students in nonclass districts.
5
  Dr. Baker did not, however: 
(1) provide evidence about or evaluate the relationship 
between the receipt of a FAPE and funding levels; (2) 
consider the other funding sources that districts received or 
how districts allocated resources; (3) evaluate the 
appropriateness or implementation of the IEPs for students in 
either class or nonclass districts; or (4) evaluate the adequacy 
of the services provided.  Moreover, Plaintiffs produced no 
                                              
 
3An IEP has been described as the “primary 
mechanism” for implementing a FAPE.  W.B. v. Matula, 67 
F.3d 484, 492 (3d Cir. 1995).  It is developed by a team of 
educators, specialists, and the student’s parents to set forth a 
plan that will “enable the child to receive meaningful 
educational benefits in light of the student’s intellectual 
potential” and unique needs.  Shore Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of 
Educ. v. P.S., 381 F.3d 194, 198 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 
4
 The District Court heard evidence concerning the 
Reading, Lancaster, Allentown, York City, and Harrisburg 
school districts.  There was insufficient evidence to show that 
students attending the Reading and Allentown School 
Districts were members of the class.   
 
5
 In discussing the standardized test performance and 
graduation rates, the District Court did not use the words 
“disabled students,” but rather described the students as those 
who receive IEPs.  It is understood that these students would 
be protected under the laws at issue in this case.   
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evidence to show that any student was deprived of a service 
because of Pennsylvania’s funding formula.  
 Aside from Dr. Baker, the District Court heard 
testimony from parents and/or educators of six students.   
Five of the students attended school in nonclass districts and 
one attended school in a class district.   The District Court 
found that Plaintiffs had failed to produce a single witness to 
testify that an IEP for any student was affected by a lack of 
funding or that any child had been denied a FAPE as a result 
of the funding formula, and stated that even if a student had 
been denied a FAPE, that denial necessarily was “the result of 
problems with the components of individual programs rather 
than systemic violations” and could have been remedied by 
taking advantage of existing administrative procedures, not 
by increased funding.
6
  App. 48.  In short, the District Court 
concluded that Plaintiffs did not show that the funding 
formula systematically denied students of a FAPE in violation 
of the IDEA.  The District Court further observed that while 
the evidence from Dr. Baker concerning the different 
educational outcomes for special education students in the 
class districts was “compelling,” App. 49, this evidence was 
of limited value in this case because Dr. Baker could not 
“directly tie funding levels to a denial of FAPE.”  Id.   
 With respect to Plaintiffs’ ADA and RA claims, the 
District Court observed that Plaintiffs’ claim that they were 
denied access to education services was based on the “same 
allegations and theories that underlie their IDEA claim.”  
                                              
 
6
 The class student’s parent testified about 
dissatisfaction at certain times with certain matters, such as 
the delay in commencing speech therapy during one academic 
year, the quality of the adaptive gym class, and the child’s 
access to computers, but the parent presented no testimony 
that any of these issues arose due to funding, and there was no 
evidence presented that these issues were emblematic of a 
systemic problem.  As to the parents of students in nonclass 
districts, they too testified about having raised concerns about 
services that they sought for their children.  They testified that 
their concerns were largely addressed and, to the extent a 
concern remained unaddressed, they provided no testimony 
that it was due to funding.   
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App. 59.  Acknowledging that there are circumstances in 
which a school could comply with the IDEA and yet fail to 
comply with the ADA and the RA, id. at 60 n.23, the District 
Court found based upon this record that “[b]ecause Plaintiffs 
have failed to establish a violation of the IDEA, and because 
the Section 504 and ADA claims are inextricably linked to 
the IDEA claims,” they did not establish a violation of the 
ADA or RA.  App. 59.  As a result, the District Court entered 
judgment in favor of Defendants on all claims.  Plaintiffs 
appeal only the District Court’s judgment on the ADA and 
RA claims. 
 When reviewing a judgment entered after a bench trial, 
we exercise plenary review over the District Court’s 
conclusions of law and review the District Court’s findings of 
fact for clear error.  Battoni v. IBEW Local Union No. 102 
Emp. Pension Plan, 594 F.3d 230, 233 (3d Cir. 2010).  
Because Plaintiffs do not challenge any of the District Court’s 
findings of fact, we accept the findings as true and exercise 
plenary review over the District Court’s legal conclusions. 
III. 
 The IDEA governs the affirmative duty to provide a 
public education to disabled students, while the ADA and RA 
embody the negative prohibition against depriving disabled 
students of public education.  W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 
492-93 (3d Cir. 1995).  Thus, the IDEA provides a remedy 
for “inappropriate educational placement decisions, 
regardless of discrimination,” while the ADA and RA 
prohibit and provide a remedy for discrimination.
7
  Hornstine 
                                              
 
7
 The ADA provides: 
[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, 
by reason of such disability, be excluded from 
participation in or be denied the benefits of the 
services, programs, or activities of a public 
entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any 
such entity. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 12132.   Moreover, the relevant regulations state 
that: 
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v. Twp. of Moorestown, 263 F. Supp. 2d 887, 901 (D.N.J. 
2003) (plaintiff received a FAPE but policy that sought to 
deny her valedictorian status was nonetheless discriminatory 
under the ADA and RA).   
                                                                                                     
 
A public entity, in providing any aid, benefit, or 
service, may not, directly or through 
contractual, licensing, or other arrangements, on 
the basis of disability-- 
 
(i) Deny a qualified individual with a disability 
the opportunity to participate in or benefit from 
the aid, benefit, or service; 
 
(ii) Afford a qualified individual with a 
disability an opportunity to participate in or 
benefit from the aid, benefit, or service that is 
not equal to that afforded others; [or] 
 
(iii) Provide a qualified individual with a 
disability with an aid, benefit, or service that is 
not as effective in affording equal opportunity 
to obtain the same result, to gain the same 
benefit, or to reach the same level of 
achievement as that provided to others . . . . 
 
28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(i)-(iii).   The RA provides: 
No otherwise qualified individual with a 
disability in the United States, as defined in 
section 705(20) of this title, shall, solely by 
reason of her or his disability, be excluded from 
the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or 
be subjected to discrimination under any 
program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance . . . . 
 
29 U.S.C. § 794(a).   
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Failure to provide a FAPE violates Part B of the 
IDEA
8
 and generally violates the ADA and RA because it 
deprives disabled students of a benefit that non-disabled 
students receive simply by attending school in the normal 
course—a free, appropriate public education.9  See Andrew 
M. v. Del. Cnty. Office of Mental Health and Mental 
Retardation, 490 F.3d 337, 350 (3d Cir. 2007).  Indeed, in 
many cases, a plaintiff’s sole theory of RA and ADA 
discrimination is that the defendant school failed to provide a 
FAPE.  Id.  Failing to provide a FAPE in violation of the 
IDEA, however, is not the sole basis on which a student may 
bring a claim of discrimination under the ADA and RA.  In 
fact, the IDEA itself states that it should not be “construed to 
restrict or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies available 
under the Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990, title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, or other 
Federal laws protecting the rights of children with 
disabilities.”  20 U.S.C. § 1415(l).  Thus, the IDEA does not 
restrict a student’s ability to pursue claims under the ADA 
and RA, and compliance with the IDEA does not 
automatically immunize a party from liability under the ADA 
or RA.  See K.M. v. Tustin Unified Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 1088, 
                                              
 
8
 The IDEA requires states receiving federal special 
education assistance to “establish and maintain procedures in 
accordance with this section to ensure that children with 
disabilities and their parents are guaranteed procedural 
safeguards with respect to the provision of a free appropriate 
public education.”  20 U.S.C. § 1415(a). 
 
9
 Providing a FAPE may also demonstrate compliance 
with the RA.  For instance, in D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 
this Court examined the school’s actions and found that it 
took proactive steps to provide the plaintiff assistance (such 
as extra time for assignments and a specialist) and provide a 
FAPE, and thus complied with the RA by reasonably 
accommodating a handicapped child to ensure meaningful 
access to and participation in educational benefits.  696 F.3d 
233, 252-53 (3d Cir. 2012).  In that case, “a finding that the 
school district did not deny D.K. a FAPE [was] equally 
dispositive of [the plaintiff’s] § 504 claim.”  696 F.3d at 253 
n.8. 
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1102 (9th Cir. 2013); Ellenberg v. N.M. Military Inst., 478 
F.3d 1262, 1281-82 (10th Cir. 2007); Hornstine, 263 F. Supp. 
2d at 901. 
 Plaintiffs take no exception to the District Court’s 
finding that they received a FAPE or its conclusion that the 
funding scheme does not violate the IDEA.  Rather, they now 
assert that Defendants violated the ADA and RA, not based 
upon an alleged failure to provide a FAPE, but on other 
grounds. 
 With limited exceptions,
10
 the same legal principles 
govern ADA and RA claims.  To prove a claim under either 
the ADA or RA, Plaintiffs must show that: (1) they are 
handicapped or disabled as defined under the statutes; (2) 
they are otherwise qualified to participate in the program at 
issue; and (3) they were precluded from participating in a 
program or receiving a service or benefit because of their 
disability.  Chambers ex rel. Chambers, 587 F.3d at 189. 
 The statutes’ respective causation elements differ.  See 
42 U.S.C. § 12132 (“by reason of such disability”); 29 U.S.C. 
§ 794(a) (“solely by reason of her or his disability”).  The RA 
allows a plaintiff to recover if he or she were deprived of an 
opportunity to participate in a program solely on the basis of 
disability, while the ADA covers discrimination on the basis 
of disability, even if there is another cause as well.
11
  To 
                                              
 
10
 One difference between the ADA and RA is that to 
bring a claim under the RA, a plaintiff must show that the 
allegedly discriminating entity receives federal funding.  
Chambers ex rel. Chambers v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of 
Educ., 587 F.3d 176, 189 n.20 (3d Cir. 2009).  There is no 
dispute that Defendants receive federal funds and are 
therefore subject to the provisions of the RA.  Another 
difference involves the causation element,  which will be 
examined later in the discussion. 
11
 Because the RA’s causation requirement requires 
disability to be the sole cause of discrimination, an alternative 
cause is fatal to an RA claim because disability would no 
longer be the sole cause.  See, e.g., Menkowitz v. Pottstown 
Mem’l Med. Ctr., 154 F.3d 113, 125 (3d Cir. 1998).  The 
existence of an alternative cause, however, may not 
10 
 
satisfy either causation requirement, Plaintiffs must prove that 
they were treated differently based on the protected 
characteristic, namely the existence of their disability.  This is 
because the “main thrust” of the ADA and RA “is to assure 
handicapped individuals receive the same benefits as the non-
handicapped,”  Easley v. Snider, 36 F.3d 297, 305 (3d Cir. 
1994), as well as to prohibit discrimination against one 
“subgroup” of disabled people as compared to another 
subgroup if the characteristic distinguishing the two 
subgroups is the nature of their respective disability.  Id. at 
306 (finding no ADA or RA violation because there was no 
“discrimination against a subgroup of the group of people 
who are physically disabled”); cf. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. 
Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 598 n.10 (1999) (stating that 
discrimination may exist among members of the same general 
protected class).  In other words, Plaintiffs must show that 
they have been deprived of a benefit or opportunity provided 
to non-disabled students or a group of students with some 
other category of disability, because of their disability.  They 
have not done so.
12
 
                                                                                                     
necessarily be fatal to an ADA claim so long as disability 
“played a role in the . . . decisionmaking process and . . . had 
a determinative effect on the outcome of that process.”  New 
Directions Treatment Servs. v. City of Reading, 490 F.3d 
293, 300 n.4 (3d Cir. 2007) (reversing the denial of summary 
judgment in favor of plaintiff in part because the District 
Court improperly applied the RA’s sole causation 
requirement to plaintiff’s ADA claim, which required only 
“but for” causation). 
12
 There is no dispute that Plaintiffs arguably satisfy 
certain elements of a claim under the ADA or the RA, 
namely: (1) they are disabled; (2) they are otherwise qualified 
to participate in school activities; and (3) as to the RA claim 
specifically, the school receives federal financial assistance.  
As to the causation element, Plaintiffs have presented some 
evidence that educational performance (as measured by test 
scores and graduation rates) in class districts is lower as 
compared to non-class districts, but they did not prove that 
lack of supplemental funding is a cause or the sole cause of 
those discrepancies and that these funding decisions were 
based on disability.    
11 
 
The core of Plaintiffs’ claim is that Pennsylvania’s 
funding formula distributes supplemental special education 
funds in a manner that gives school districts with higher 
numbers of disabled students less supplemental funding per 
disabled student than those districts with lower numbers of 
disabled students.   Even assuming that this scheme has a 
disparate impact on certain disabled students,
13
 and even if 
the inequity stems at least in part from the location of their 
school, this alone is insufficient to prove a claim under the 
RA or ADA.  Indeed, the Supreme Court has “reject[ed] the 
boundless notion that all disparate-impact showings constitute 
prima facie cases under” the RA.  Alexander v. Choate, 469 
U.S. 287. 299 (1985).   Rather, as Alexander instructed, the 
Act requires that “an otherwise qualified handicapped 
individual must be provided with meaningful access to the 
benefit” offered.  Id. at 301.  Thus, to establish liability, 
Plaintiffs must prove that the qualified individual has been 
deprived of meaningful access to a benefit to which he or she 
was entitled. 
 
 
 Plaintiffs here have failed to produce evidence to 
show that the funding formula deprived the class members of 
a program, benefit, or service that was provided to the 
                                              
13
 Judge Roth notes that she does not consider the 
disparate impact of the funding mechanism here to be an 
“even if” assumption.  She concludes that this funding 
mechanism subjects students with disabilities to disparate 
treatment “by reason of” their disability.  29 U.S.C. § 12132; 
42 U.S.C. § 794(a).  Pennsylvania specifically selected a 
funding formula that depends, in part, on its assumptions 
about the concentration of students with disabilities.  The 
funding formula therefore takes the student’s disability status 
as a relevant metric in distributing funds.  Having done so, the 
formula then provides less funding for some students with a 
disability vis-à-vis others—the very essence of a disparate 
impact claim.  See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 598 & n.10 (noting 
that discrimination prohibited by the ADA includes policies 
that create differential effects between the same class of 
individuals); Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 336 n.21 (3d 
Cir. 1995) (same).   
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disabled students who attend schools in the nonclass districts.  
The District Court’s unchallenged factual findings support the 
conclusion that there is an absence of evidence that any class 
member was deprived of a service available to nonclass 
members.
14
  Thus, based on this record, we are compelled to 
reject Plaintiffs’ claim that the use of the 16% figure and its 
resulting disparity in per student funding for students in class 
districts as compared to nonclass districts violates the ADA or 
RA. 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of the District Court. 
                                              
 
14
 As the District Court appropriately noted, Plaintiffs 
produced performance metrics that appear to show that the 
special education students in Pennsylvania are not making the 
type of progress that one would hope they could achieve.  
That said, the role of a federal court is to evaluate the 
evidence under the governing law.  Here, the evidence 
adduced did not show that these differing outcomes were the 
result of the funding formula and thus, Plaintiffs have not 
demonstrated on this record that the formula violates the RA 
or ADA.      
 
